What would President Kamala Harris' foreign policy look like?

With the US elections just days away, the world is collectively holding its breath, even as one imagines it might be intoxicated by now. This is no mere exaggeration: whoever ends up in the Oval Office will dramatically influence the foreign policy of countries around the world. With Donald Trump, you can usually get a glimpse of what's coming next – something unsettling, probably loud and definitely memorable. But Kamala Harris? Well, the crystal ball is fogging up a little, isn't it?

Asking what a Harris administration's foreign policy would look like is more like asking a cat its opinion on quantum mechanics: you're unlikely to get much clarity. There was largely a lack of any discernible worldview that would distinguish her from her boss, Joe Biden. In fact, one could say that their foreign policy is as elusive as the Hungarian summer – everyone has vague expectations, but no one is quite sure what it will look like when it finally arrives.

However, there's a tried-and-tested way to find out these things: look at the man who's probably calling the shots behind the scenes. In this case, that would be Philip H. Gordon, her current national security adviser and author of Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East (2020). Gordon's influence on Harris is already strong and he is a far more interesting character than the usual Beltway apparatchik. He is a scholar, a critic of past US interventionism, and has enough gravitas to suggest that a Harris administration might actually move away from the tired, old obsession with foreign policy intervention. Then again, it's Washington we're talking about. Donald Trump had HR McMaster as his national security adviser – a man who was an author The Criticism of how poor presidential leadership led to the failed US war in Vietnam. However, he was succeeded by John Bolton, known for his relentless desire to bomb Iran.

Gordon, for his part, is a man of experience — which in Washington is a polite way of saying he's been in the game long enough to be deeply involved in or exposed to disasters. From his time in the Clinton administration covering European affairs, to his role as special assistant and coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, to President Barack Obama, Gordon has seen it all – and, crucially, written about it too. Losing the long game is a searing critique of the United States' penchant for regime change in the Middle East, which has consistently gone horribly wrong.

“Your government could be much more cautious about military interventions”

Gordon's central thesis is that regime change efforts of various stripes, although often seductively presented as the “solution” to all of Washington's problems, have invariably left America worse off. He recounts U.S. misadventures in the region, from the overthrow of Iranian President Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 to recent train accidents in Iraq, Libya and Syria. The takeaway? U.S. policymakers don't seem to know how to stop. Instead, they seem to be constantly under the spell of wishful thinking and believe that Only Another war, another intervention, and the Middle East magically becomes a stable, democratic paradise (although one can assume that this line of thought extends to other regions as well). And like the loyal assistants of an eccentric inventor, they are always shocked when things don't go as planned.

So what does this tell us about a possible Harris presidency? For one thing, their government could be much more cautious about military interventions, particularly in the Middle East – at least in the Middle East. Gordon has been advising Harris for years and his influence is felt. He's not a fan of the crude regime-change fantasies that characterized the George W. Bush years, and it's safe to assume Harris won't be either. Your administration could take a more restrained approach — one that favors diplomacy and multilateralism over sending in Marines at the first sign of trouble. At least we can hope so.

Take the Israel-Palestine conflict, for example. Gordon was a proponent of a two-state solution, which makes him seem somewhere between unorthodox and radical in Washington, depending on the mood. His recent comments have been less than sympathetic to Israel's handling of its security. He criticized settlement expansion in the West Bank and argued that Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories is not exactly the path to long-term peace. If Harris follows his lead—and let's face it, she probably would—her administration could push Israel a little harder to find a sustainable political solution, rather than just giving it a blank check for military action. One can imagine that this would be as well received by Benjamin Netanyahu as it would be by a guiding balloon.

“A Harris administration could push Israel a little harder to find a sustainable political solution.”

But if Gordon's views suggest that Harris would shy away from military adventurism, that doesn't mean she is about to become an isolationist. Gordon's brand of realism is not the dour, cynical kind of John Mearsheimer-style “Realpolitik.” No, he still believes that the United States has an important role to play on the world stage and that the country will continue to be “on the right side of history.” But this role should come with a hefty dose of humility. America, he argues, must recognize that it cannot solve every problem, and it certainly should not try to do so with force.

Of course Gordon is not a pigeon. He still believes in the importance of American engagement in the world – he just wants it to be done with a little more finesse. He argues for a version of liberal internationalism that promotes democracy and protects human rights without becoming mired in another quagmire à la Iraq.

But in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, where old Washingtonians worry about America's waning global influence, it's hard to imagine a Harris administration that truly resorts to restraint. The temptation to maintain U.S. dominance may prove too great, especially as the world becomes more chaotic and competitive.

Gordon may advocate caution, but his worldview is still deeply rooted in the belief that the United States must lead. In a Democratic establishment frightened by the specter of rising authoritarianism, from Russia to China to populist movements in Europe, it is unlikely that a Harris administration would sit idly by while the liberal international Order dissolves. Today, there is a deep fear among the foreign policy class—particularly among Democrats—that they are witnessing the demise of American hegemony. And when a superpower feels its status is faltering, restraint is often jettisoned in favor of restoring dominance, no matter how much Gordon's writings preach to the contrary.

Let's not forget that Biden himself spoke of restoring America's leadership on the world stage when he took office, and his administration hasn't exactly held back when it comes to intensifying great power competition with China. Could a Harris administration really resist pressure within its own party to “confront authoritarianism abroad,” especially when those same voices are screaming bloody murder about the survival of democracy at home? It's all well and good to talk about restraint, but when Washington's foreign policy elite believe the sky is falling, they rarely settle for subtle diplomacy and multilateral forums. America's strategic culture favors proactive engagement in the face of the threat of regional instability.

Even if Harris makes a few nods to Gordon's cautious realism, chances are her administration will fall into the same patterns and try to “do more” to maintain American influence and counter rising powers. Diplomacy, cooperation and common sense are all well and good, but at a time of perceived decline and the rise of new challengers, liberal internationalists in Washington continue to conclude that a little less restraint – and a little more intervention – is exactly what is needed the moment requires.